Introduction
That a legal writing professor would review two books about language could be read to admit that the field of legal writing is primarily concerned with grammar and usage. Indeed, if the books were didactic or unsophisticated, they might even support such a view. However, the best books in the field, like those under review here, serve the same ends as the field of legal writing itself: they point to deeper truths about the use of language and its consequences.
The legal writing process involves deep analytical work that is carried on through the medium of language. Creating language in contracts, briefs, judicial opinions, and even the humble legal memo creates law itself: cases turn on the meanings of words, and at times cases turn even on marks of punctuation, as a recent celebrated case involving the so-called Oxford comma illustrates. 1 When legal writing professors initiate students into the legal discourse community, we provide them a new set of language tools. We care, as we should, that students know how to express themselves clearly and concisely, becoming skillful at handling these tools. Moreover, we should also want them to be sensitive to the ways in which legal language protects or abrogates claimed rights by including and excluding people from legal categories.
In support of these goals, books about language ought to occupy pride of place on lawyers' and legal writing professors' bookshelves. Two recent contributions to that genre use observations about language as a touchstone for a nuanced examination of deeper truths about language, culture, and law in a changing world. Mary Norris, a longtime copy editor at , respectively. These books joyfully embrace the ways language shapes the society in which we live and influences its legal culture. Law students, lawyers, and law professors will benefit from journeying with Norris and Stamper through the world of language towards the goal of crafting prose that is clear, accurate, and inclusive. The itinerary for this review's journey traverses the changing world of writing and publishing, navigates the rough terrain of attempting to define consistent, binding linguistic rules, and concludes by considering the consequences of language as a medium for conveying law.
I. Against a backdrop of change
The process of how writers work has been upended in the past twenty years or so. The digital revolution has wrought massive changes in American society and culture, and during this period both Norris and Stamper have been eyewitnesses to the impacts of increased interconnectedness and big data on writers. Their books are a bit nostalgic for the pre-digital era. Stamper's early years, in which dictionary writers used an elaborate system of color-coded index cards, seem a delightful time to work, presenting an environment in which knowledge could be written down, managed, categorized, and saved in physical files. Similarly, Norris' portraits of The New Yorker's copy editing giants Eleanor Gould and Lu Burke evoke a bygone era, as does her ode to the copy editor's pencil and its sharpeners. While the world still has room for printed media and pencils, Stamper admits that "everything has been electronic for some time," and she details how big data in the form of corpus linguistics (large, digitized, searchable collections of source-texts) has transformed lexicographers' efforts to track the use of a particular word in our language. 4 To an extent, Norris endorses technological tools, proclaiming that disabling spell-check would be an act of "hubris." 5 At the same time, she recognizes that every new technology does not improve life and that she could "do without" autocorrect. 6 Keeping up with technological change prevents writers from becoming mired in the chaos created by the deluge of digital information; Norris and Stamper are thoughtful writers who have weathered these changes well.
Changes in how content is created are, of course, only the tip of the iceberg. Technology has also transformed content delivery and the economics of publication writ large. Stamper writes honestly about the challenges, describing Merriam-Webster's "first large-scale layoff in decades" as "neither interesting nor unique" given the fact that lexicography is a "shrinking industry." 7 Both lexicography and print journalism face ongoing, existential threats from the ready availability of (often unfiltered, unedited) online content, and both industries constantly adapt to remain relevant and viable. Both Merriam-Webster and The New Yorker offer online subscriptions and cabin some content behind a paywall, but they also employ websites and social media accounts to tease their products and spur interest in their brands. 8 As these evolving developments in the world of publication unfold, written language continues to be central to the human experience, and people still care about it. Even modern readers and 4 STAMPER, WORD BY WORD, supra note 3, at 18 n. writers continue to expect dictionary definitions that are "right on the money" 9 and continue to value The New Yorker's contributions to the head, heart, and soul of the nation. Stamper and Norris both wax eloquent about the joys of their chosen professions. The last word goes to Norris on this point: "Except for writing," Norris declares, "I have never seriously considered doing anything else." 10
II. On Grammar
Each book is more collection than curriculum. The writers have not written systematic grammatical treatises; instead, they describe common linguistic problems and propose solutions tempered by anecdote, experience, and common sense. Stamper focuses on the definition of words and matters of usage, while Norris's docket includes these topics and extends to matters of punctuation and style. To skim the surface, Stamper devotes chapters to "wrong words," like "irregardless;" to the murky meaning of "small words" like "take" (take a cookie, take a hike (in both senses), being on the take, etc.); and to the basics of writing a dictionary-defining words, crafting example sentences, recording pronunciations, and researching etymology. 11 Similarly, Norris devotes chapters to the major marks of punctuation (her discussion of hyphens and dashes is delightful for its exploration of the work of writers such as Emily Dickenson and Herman Melville) as well as profanity, pronouns, and common usage errors. 12 For both Norris and Stamper, the concept of grammar itself implicates larger forces at work. Both writers wrestle with the question whether grammar should describe the language as it is used (the "descriptivist" position) or whether grammar should prescribe rules for all to follow (the "prescriptivist" position). Both books recount the dictionary wars of the 1960s, triggered by the 1961 publication of the descriptivist Webster's Third New International Dictionary. 13 Through the lens of these struggles, the relationship between language and culture begins to come into view. Stamper, as a modern lexicographer, adheres to a decidedly descriptivist view, decrying most commonly understood grammar rules (for example, the admonition against ending a sentence with a preposition) as merely "the personal peeves, codified into law, of dead white men of yore." 14 Stamper adopts the linguist's definition of grammar: "systematic rules" that govern "the way that words interact with each other in a sentence." 15 On her view, a lexicographer's personal peeve must yield in light of contrary evidence of how language is actually used. 16 Yet, this simply begs the question of whose usage will be the authority-we may no longer limit ourselves to the "white men of yore," but should we discount them entirely? And who else should be our guide?
Norris, even though she works at The New Yorker, a "bastion of prescriptivism," 17 is herself mainly descriptivist. She admits that "[y]ou cannot legislate language" 18 and resists the image of the copy editor as "someone who favors a rigid constancy, a mean person who enjoys pointing out other people's errors." 19 Norris herself is hardly mean or rigid, but she does hold to standards. The title of the book ("Between You and Me") is intended to correct "one of the most barbarous habits in contemporary usage," the ubiquitous "between you and I" error 20 -an error for which Norris calls out formerPresident Barack Obama, though she does allow that Obama was "our most eloquent president in decades." 21 Indeed, as those of us who teach writing know, our students will be held to standards, and those standards may at times seem "usage panel" consisting of language experts, including, for many years, Antonin Scalia. Id. at 251-52. Stamper reports that an ad for the first edition of the American Heritage pictured a "long-haired young hippie" alongside copy that read, "He doesn't like your politics. Why should he like your dictionary?" Id. at 247. One can imagine Justice Scalia smiling at such an ad. 14 arbitrary. Court rules impose limits that in most cases have little relation to the subject matter being litigated. The Bluebook insists on citation standards that, to put it mildly, do not always make logical sense. Supervising attorneys will judge writing based upon their own experiences and ideas about what is "correct." Norris and Stamper recognize that language expresses acceptance and rejection in myriad ways. Stamper raises the delicate issue of dialect, noting that speakers of certain dialects can be subjected to "stereotype and scrutiny." 22 She describes her own youthful experiences of absorbing linguistic habits from black and Chicano classmates and recounts how these habits exposed her to the judgment of others, including her own mother. 23 For Norris, the consequences of language play out a bit differently but no less consequentially. After tilling the familiar terrain surrounding English's lack of a gender-neutral third-person singular pronoun, Norris relates in starkly personal terms how pronouns nearly came between her and a transgender sibling. 24 In a similar vein, Stamper acknowledges the minefield lexicographers face in defining words like "bitch" or "nude." Stamper is disquieted that the entry for "bitch" managed to go decades without an indication that it is vulgar, obscene, or some other taboo. 25 Further, she notes Merriam-Webster's struggle with race in the definition of the word "nude," initially defined (in part) as "having the color of a white person's skin." 26 Even a descriptivist dictionary, it turns out, reflects cultural norms relating to gender and race. For Norris, a matter as small as punctuation can be a marker of class. I shudder upon reading her description of the semi-colon-a punctuation mark I favor (read: overuse)-as "upper-crust" and "best used by the British." 27 In her view, emphasized twice, "Americans can do without 22 STAMPER, WORD BY WORD, supra note 3, at 60. 23 I use the term "Chicano" here because it is the word Stamper uses to describe her classmates. Id. at 61. 24 NORRIS, supra note 2, at 71-76. 25 STAMPER, WORD BY WORD, supra note 3, at 149-168. Stamper's "Author's Note" to her 2018 paperback edition reports that a usage note was added after the initial publication of WORD BY WORD in 2017. STAMPER, PAPERBACK, supra note 3, at 265. 26 STAMPER, WORD BY WORD, supra note 3, at 221. The definition has been changed to "having a color (such as pale beige or tan) that matches the wearer's skin tones." Id. at 228. 27 NORRIS, supra note 2, at 140. The basis for her view is that semi-colons are markers of "a classical education . . . perhaps because they are needed to translate Latin and Greek." Id.
the semicolon," 28 though she does admit that she would not change a single semicolon in the work of Henry James. 29 Language, especially written language, has the power to reveal one's priors, to let slip one's views of life and the world.
III. Implications for the Legal Community
Like language, law plays out against a backdrop of cultural change in which norms about the treatment of various groups of people have been shifting rapidly. As an initial matter, Stamper's description of the process of defining words 30 is not dissimilar to the lawyer's craft of articulating rules of law synthesized from various authorities. A lexicographer sifts evidence of how a word has been used, reconciles conflicting examples, and operates in a system that preferences some people and marginalizes others, 31 just as a lawyer must collect, analyze, and evaluate past precedents.
Stamper's reflections on the changing definition of the word "marriage" illustrate the connections between law and culture and provide yet another example of a situation where use of language reflects judgments about inclusion and exclusion. In 2003, MerriamWebster added the following to the definition of marriage: "the state of being united to a person of the same sex in a relationship like that of a traditional marriage." 32 At the time, two states had enacted domestic partnership or civil union legislation, and four states had limited marriage to one man and one woman. By 2009, the marriage wars intensified. Marriage rights were extended to same-sex couples in three states by decisions of the states' highest courts, and a handful of additional states enacted civil unions. Other states enacted statelevel defense-of-marriage acts or constitutional amendments. Moreover, by 2009, Barack Obama had become the nation's first black President. Although Obama was not, at the time, a supporter of equal marriage rights, the anxieties of culturally conservative citizens were raised over this issue. Predictably, complaints and hate mail over the changed definition of "marriage" began to pour into Stamper captures the outrage: writers "believe that if we make a change to the dictionary, then we have made a change to the language, and if we make a change to the language, then we also make a change to the culture around that language." 34 Stamper unsurprisingly disclaims this level of power for dictionaries (noting that we cannot eliminate pejorative use of the word "retarded" by removing it from the dictionary) 35 , but the episode illustrates the powerful interactions between language, law, and culture. Interestingly, Stamper points out that Obergefell was decided after "every major dictionary in use" made changes to the definition of marriage 36 It may be true that the Court's substantive due process jurisprudence follows the culture; but perhaps the dictionary is the best place to look for evidence of cultural change. 37 What does this mean for law students and professors of legal writing? The same words that memorialize legal rights speak to underlying cultural realities. The language of the law has consequences that humanize and dehumanize people. To point to a timely and controversial example, the Immigration Act refers to people who are not citizens of the United States as "aliens." 38 Many in the popular culture, including the current President of the United States, refer to these people as "illegals" when they are present in the country without authorization. 39 We should want our students to consider their words carefully, especially as they address the hardest issues they will face, because denotative and connotative meanings matter. Norris and Stamper provide insights that will help us teach our students to approach writing tasks in a literate, thoughtful, and sensitive way. Framing legal issues in better language, we can hope, 34 Id. at 241. 35 Id. at 241-42. 36 Id. at 252. Stamper notes that the only Obergefell opinion to actually cite dictionaries is Chief Justice Roberts' dissent. Id. 37 Stamper adds an important postscript to the 2018 paperback edition of her book, noting that the "straight" and "gay" subsenses of "marriage" have been merged into one definition that is gender-neutral. STAMPER, PAPERBACK, supra note 3, at 263-64. Stamper terms this a "correction." Id. at 263. After Obergefell, "[l]egally, same-sex marriage wasn't an analogue to straight marriage anymore; it was all just 'marriage' now. The revision reflects the current legal status of gay marriage in the United States." Id. at 264. 38 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (2012). The definitions section does not use the term "illegal" in reference to people. Id. 39 A search of Donald Trump's archived tweets reveals fifty-three tweets dated from April 1, 2013 to July 11, 2018 that use the term "illegals" in reference to people. TRUMP TWITTER ARCHIVE, http://www.trumptwitterarchive.com (last visited August 21, 2018).
